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THE DIMINISHED GIANT SYNDROME
How Declinism Drives Trade Policy
Jagdish Bhagwati
THE PERGEPTION, farexceeding the reality, of
American decline is having subdy
harmful consequences for U.S.
international economic policy. The
curse of declinism, manifest from
the mid-1980s but contained by the
Bush administration, was indulged
to excess by Bill Glinton's cam-
paign. Its political success in ending
Republican presidential reign adds
a lethal edge to the prospect that
U.S. leadership will be sacrificed to
the myopic and self-indulgent pur-
suit of "what's in it for us" econom-
ic policies in the world arena.
The American mood parallels
Great Britain's at the end of the
nineteenth century. Germany and
the United States had emerged on
the world economic scene as major
players, threatening the end of the
British Gentury. Today it is Japan
that has emerged, threatening to
open a Pacific Gentury. As was
Great Britain at that time, America
has been struck by a "diminished
giant syndrome"^reinforced by the
slippage in the growth of its living
standards in the 1980s. This afflic-
tion has caused a loss of confidence
in America's inherited postwar
trade policies.
When the syndrome hit Great
Britain unilateral free trade had
been received doctrine, with Ger-
many and the United States seen,
correcdy, as embracing tariffs to
protect nascent industries. The
ensuing debate was about renounc-
ing British unilateralism, which had
been practiced with a passion for
nearly half a century. In the United
States a parallel view has
grown—^with presumably immense
infiuence in the Glinton administra-
tion—that America too has dis-
armed itself unilaterally in trade
while others compete "unfairly"
and that the time has come to shift
from being patsies who turn the
other cheek to becoming aggressive
traders.
The British reality of asymmetri-
cal trade barriers, which survived
that nineteenth-century debate, is
matched today only by America's
perception of the same. This per-
ception is grossly disproportionate
to the reality, but it is driving Wash-
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ington toward trade policies that
could well endanger the postwar
trading system that it has so assidu-
ously nurtured for more than forty
years. It rests on a measure of self-
serving exaggeration and distortion
of facts, all a result of the panic and
petulance that attend the dimin-
ished giant syndrome. Two exam-
ples should illustrate.
First, the belief is strong on Capi-
tol Hill that, in the postwar period
of nearly half a century, America
gave away trade concessions and
collected few in return. This was
true in a few cases, as with develop-
ing countries and Europe right after
World War 11. But after the earliest
rounds of multilateral negotiations,
in every successive round America
has sought and gained balanced
concessions. Indeed, by most judg-
ments the proposed "Dunkel Draft"
agreement for the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) is heavily
unbalanced in America's favor.
Reciprocity, not unilateralism, has
been America's motto in trade
through nearly all its history. The
contrary notion rests on a myth.
But, held with conviction, it fuels
the sense that America needs to
sudtch from a multilateral exchange
of concessions to unilateral
demands for unrequited concessions
by others. The earlier bargains
were "unfair." Thus the new order
should redress the imbalance that
America's altruism spawned and
which the aggrieved power can now
ill afford.
Second, the notion that Japan is
"closed" is by now accepted among
many as an article of faith. It con-
tinually leads to demands for man-
aged trade in the shape of commit-
ments by Tokyo for quantitative
import targets and export conces-
sions by Japanese industries. But
these demands do not distinguish
between "openness" and "penetra-
bility." The Japanese market is
open to manufactured imports,
largely as a result of the trade liber-
alizations of the early 1980s. The
U.S. market, on the other hand, is
dominated by voluntary export
restraints (on automobiles, among
other items) and antidumping
actions, from which Japan has
abstained. But there remain many
complaints of the difficulty of pene-
tration resulting from Japanese
institutions and practices that create
witting and unwitting roadblocks to
market access.
These cascading complaints are
often a reflection of the fact that the
Japanese economy has different
institutional features that are a con-
sequence of its history. Japan's suc-
cess in escaping colonization and its
policy of selectively importing for-
eign technology and ideas—and
even of keeping foreigners at a dis-
tance within Japan—have prevent-
ed the extensive acculturation that
other countries such as China and
India went through over a century
ago. Japan has been exposed to this
process only since its postwar occu-
pation. By now, however, the
nation is changing rapidly. The new
pace of acculturation is reflected in
the prominent Japanese novelist
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Junichiro Tanizaki's poignant essay,
"In Praise of Shadows," which
laments the passing of the old
Japan. But acculturation works not
merely through the conventional
diffusion of American culture. It
EJSO operates through the extensive
presence abroad of Japanese multi-
nationals, and hence Japanese exec-
utives and their families.
The perception that the Japanese
market is open and substantial has
finally led to an increased willing-
ness to undertake the added fixed
' costs necessary to enter it. The
complaints about Japan's impene-
trability are a clear sign that Japan
is, in fact, being penetrated effec-
tively. The unfamiliarity of the ter-
rain is generating unreasonable
demands that the Japanese land-
scape be remade in America's ovm
image. The results of this penetra-
tion are refiected in the unprece-
dented rise in the late 1980s in the
ratio of manufactured imports to
GNP and as a share of total imports.
Demands for widespread changes in
Japanese institutions and for man-
aged trade, quite aside from their
potential for damage to a rules-
based world trading regime, thus
refiect a panic that is not justified
by the unfolding situation.
Japan's chronic payments surplus
is not a sign of its "closed" market
or of predation by Japanese
exporters in America's "open" mar-
ket. Balance of payments surpluses
and deficits reflect macroeconomic
factors, not trade barriers. Occa-
sionally, concerned congressional
representatives will bow to this eco-
nomic logic. More often, however,
they revert to what they think is
surely "obvious." Thus many in
Gongress now seek to renew the
Super 301 provision of the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Gompetitive-
ness Act, which would enable the
Glinton administration to tag coun-
tries such as Japan as unfair
traders—the criterion being that the
competing nation accounts for
more than 15 percent of the U.S.
trade deficit. In her confirming tes-
timony, even the president's chief
economist, Laura D'Andrea Tyson,
appeared to give a nod to this
notion of a trade-barrier-caused
payments deficit.
Of course, the Japanese trade
surplus has grown even as its trade
barriers have come down. Nor
should one forget that, for a longer
period than the "chronic" Japanese
surplus, there existed the dreaded
"doUar shortage" after World War
II—and America would hardly
accuse itself of being a closed or
closing economy during those years
of extensive trade liberalization.
Nonetheless the Japanese surplus
creates an inexorable sense that this
"proves" that Japan is "closed" and,
in turn, it drives demands for fool-
ish changes in U.S. trade policy.
The corrosive influence of these
sentiments and misunderstandings
is manifest in poHcy shifts that are
already diluting the U.S. commit-
ment to multilateralism, even as the
president offers occasional support
for the Uruguay Round.
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Unilateralism Hurts GATT
Q UPPORT FOR aggressive
KJ unilateralism has grown.
Threats of protectionist retaliation
when others fail to meet either mul-
tilateral or bilateral treaty obliga-
tions is not the issue. It is only an
issue when Washington uses its eco-
nomic power to attempt to secure
new concessions or changes in
established trade practices that it
unilaterally declares unfair or unac-
ceptable. Such trade threats create
the impression, now worldwide,
that America believes in the law of
the jungle rather than the rule of
lavk'—especially when these trade
retaliations themselves are illegal
under GATT.
The Clinton campaign unfortu-
nately committed itself to reviving
the lapsed Super 301 legislation in
its manifesto, "Putting People
First." This proposed legislation,
alongside the attachment to the use
of unilateralism, has added yet
another objection to U.S. accep-
tance of the Dunkel Draft to settle
the Uruguay Round: Washington
now seeks to make the use of 301 -
type trade retaliation legal under
GATT. This demand is most unlikely
to be met since, as GATT chief
Arthur Dunkel is supposed to have
remarked, the best thing that the
United States did for the GATT was
to start down the 301 and Super
301 road, thus unifying an outraged
and alarmed world behind the trad-
ing regime.
The problem with the embrace
of aggressive unilateralism is that, in
the end, other countries will not
suffer it gladly. The use of Super
301 in 1989 did not work against
India and Brazil, which both
refused to bow to U.S. demands.
Japan responded tangentially and
eventually settled with few conces-
sions. Taiwan and South Korea
made small concessions to avoid
being named. The European Com-
munity (EC) was left unmolested,
having made amply clear its inten-
tion not to be browbeaten.
The reaction in Japan to the
prospect of reviving Super 301 is
likely to be more spirited this time.
The Matsushita Committee report
and business groups have argued
for Japan to arm itself with Super
301 legislation of its own; there has
been similar talk in Europe.
Undoubtedly some countries would
take the United States to the GATT
dispute settlement process if it
became clear that, unlike the Bush
administration, which tended to
moderate the use of such actions,
the Clinton administration was
enthusiastic for them.
Widespread use of Super 301 -
style tools would create an environ-
ment in which countries, even if not
engaged in trade wars, would be
charging each other unilaterally
with unfair trade practices, psych-
ing each other out with tough talk
and threatened action. The atmos-
pherics would become conducive to
a breakdown of the trust and confi-
dence necessary to maintaining an
orderly, predictable trading sys-
tem—precisely the climate in which
protectionism may flourish. An
excellent illustration is provided by
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the threatened use of the antidump-
ing clause by Detroit's Big Three
automakers. Once they thought
that the Glinton administration
favored aggressive action against
foreign competition, they resorted
to the "unfair trade" mechanism to
secure their ends, as would be
expected. But once foreign firms are
unilaterally characterized as preda-
tory or as being unfairly assisted by
their own governments, or once for-
eign governments are accused of
protecting their home turf—as
indeed the Glinton people are given
to doing—the outbreak of real
trade wars looms that much larger.
Danger of Trade Blocs
D EGLINIST sentimentsmay push the United States
dangerously close to regionalism.
Again there is an interesting parallel
with Britian. In nineteenth-century
Britain those who wanted to resort
to (reciprocal) protection often also
favored imperial preference, which
would reserve British colonies for
British goods, against Germany and
America.
Today the enthusiasm for region-
al free trade areas is dressed up as a
great free trade move. But it is evi-
dent that the main motivation is
protectionist: Mexico becomes
America's preferential market, with
Japan and the EC at a disadvantage.
Surely the relatively lukewarm
enthusiasm among most American
business groups for the Uruguay
Round—as compared to passionate
support for the North American
Free Trade Agreement—can be
attributed in large part to the fact
that any advantages America gains
under GATT are equally doled out to
rivals in the EC and Japan, while
under NAFTA they fiow asymmetri-
cally to the United States.
As long as the talk of "head to
head" confrontation with the EC
and Japan drives U.S. policy—with
its zero-sum implication that their
success means America's fail-
ure—^Washington will move toward
preferential trading arrangements.
As it pushes yet further into South
America, Washington will certainly
provoke an Asian trading bloc.
Unless the United States stops
NAFTA at Mexico and turns firmly
toward GATT-based multilateralism,
a likely consequence of its obsession
with decline will be a fragmented
world of four blocs: an augmented
EC; NAFTA extending into the Amer-
icas; a Japan-centered Asian bloc;
and a fourth "bloc" of marginalized
nations such as those of South Asia
and Africa whose recent shift
toward outward trade will be frus-
trated by preferential trade arrange-
ments. That would be a tragedy.
Pessimism about America's abili-
ty to lead in the teeth of its diffi-
dence and declinism is only accen-
tuated when one focuses on the
prospects it faces in trade poHcy.
Economists, whose science is soft
rather than hard, are inordinately
pleased when their predictions turn
out. Nonetheless, in the present
instance my failure would please me
all the more. ^

